ITU, Radio Regulations Board, State Power, and the Silencing of Iranians’ Last Connection to the Internet

When the most recent wave of protests began in Iran in January and escalated across the country, the government responded in a way that has become disturbingly familiar: by shutting down the Internet. This time, one of the longest and the most severe shutdowns in history.

Major network operators were throttled or disabled (in uneven ways, so that the ruling party could still remain connected) leaving vast parts of the population effectively cut off from the global Internet. For many Iranians, the only remaining pathway to connectivity became satellite Internet, most notably Starlink.

Even that lifeline was fragile.

Despite being criminalized for personal use by the Islamic Republic, Starlink terminals began to appear across the country in small numbers. Estimates suggested there were only 50,000 to 80,000 active terminals, a tiny figure for a nation of millions, yet their impact was meaningful. Through them, families sent messages, journalists transmitted images and testimony, and people who had been pushed into silence found a way to speak again.

Jamming efforts intensified. The state tried repeatedly to disrupt the signals. But even with interference, the system worked well enough to allow fragments of evidence to escape the blackout.

This was the last remaining channel to the world.

Then the Islamic Republic moved to close that last door.

It sent a formal submission to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Radio Regulations Board claiming that terrorists were using Starlink inside Iran and asserting that its nationwide Internet shutdowns were proportionate and justified. The government requested that the matter be discussed by the Radio Regulations Board in March, effectively asking a UN technical body to validate its position and force Starlink to shut down the few terminals it had.

After learning about Iran’s submission, we contacted the ITU and the Radio Regulations Board to stress what was at stake. If the government’s narrative went unchallenged, the consequences could be severe not only for Iranians but for other countries that want to assert their sovereignty through shutdowns. Starlink is not a luxury tool in Iran; it is an emergency channel. Removing or delegitimizing it would further isolate an already silenced population.

We asked for the opportunity to explain how communities inside Iran are affected, to present evidence that contradicts the government’s claims, and to ensure that the discussion reflects more than a single state’s account of events. In our letter, we wrote:

“Please find our formal response to the letter from the Islamic Republic of Iran dated January 13, 2026… titled ‘Submission by the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran Regarding the Provision of Starlink Satellite Services in Its Territory.’ We request that the Board review this submission in preparation for the RRB26.1 meeting in March 2026. We strongly advocate for the establishment of a consultation process that includes civil society and advocates for digital and human rights.”

The response we received from the Radio Regulations Board was clear and procedural. We were told that our submission could not even be processed because we were not a member state:

“In searching our records, we could not find your organization as representing any of the ITU Member States. Note that ONLY Member States can submit submissions to the RRB; therefore we are unable to process your submission.”

We escalated the issue to the Secretary-General, requesting a meeting to explain how communities are affected and to bring forward evidence that challenges the Iranian government’s claims.

Instead of a direct engagement, a press response followed:

“Thank you for your message of 26 January 2026.

The International Telecommunication Union works every day to promote universal access to telecommunications. We recognize that the Internet is not just an essential part of daily life around the world, it is often a lifeline.

The Radio Regulations Board is an independent technical and regulatory body composed of members elected by ITU Member States. The work of the Board is guided by the Radio Regulations, the binding international treaty governing the use of radio-frequency spectrum. As you note, the Board’s Rules of Procedure provide that Board meetings are not open to external participation and that Submissions can only be made by ITU Member States.

We deeply value dialogue with a broad range of stakeholders and actively promote multistakeholder engagement across many areas of our work. For matters related to the Radio Regulations Board, we thank you for understanding that the ITU Secretariat must respect the independence and authority of the Board, including the institutional and legal framework within which it operates.”

This response captures the core tension.

On the one hand, the Internet is described as a lifeline. On the other, the institutional structure ensures that the only actors who can shape decisions in critical moments are states — including the very governments that impose shutdowns.

In its ruling previously, the Radio Regulations Board effectively endorsed state action against the very infrastructure that had allowed Iranians to remain connected. The decision includes language that: requests the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran to pursue efforts to identify and deactivate unauthorized Starlink terminals in its territory; again requests the Administration of Norway to comply with relevant resolutions and regulatory provisions; strongly urges the Administration of Norway to take all appropriate actions to have the operator of the Starlink system immediately disable unauthorized transmissions within the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran.See the ruling here

It encourages a government already engaged in systematic shutdowns to locate and deactivate the few remaining terminals that people rely on to communicate. It also calls on the licensing state and operator to ensure that connectivity is cut off from the outside.

This is not a neutral technical posture. It is a process designed to rule in favor of the state actor and not connectivity.

To understand why this is troubling, it helps to compare it with similar moments in other Internet governance arenas.

When Russia’s invasion of Ukraine prompted calls to confiscate Russian IP address resources, or when proposals surfaced at ICANN to remove .RU from the root zone, those debates unfolded in environments where civil society could respond. Experts, NGOs, companies, and technical actors wrote counter-letters, presented alternative evidence, and challenged state narratives and discussed impact. These processes were messy and contested, but they allowed multiple perspectives to exist.

At the ITU, the situation is fundamentally different.

Despite repeated claims of openness and multistakeholder engagement, particularly when the organization speaks about its role in Internet governance, key decision-making spaces remain state-centric. In practice, only member states and their official delegates are allowed to meaningfully contribute to certain processes. Civil society, dissidents, and affected communities are excluded at the exact moment their voices are most needed.

This episode raises a deeper governance question that goes beyond Iran.

When Internet access becomes a matter of survival, when it is the last channel for families, journalists, and civil society, who gets to speak in the rooms where that access is debated?

In multistakeholder venues, state claims can be challenged. Evidence can be weighed. Counter-arguments can be made publicly. Even if outcomes are imperfect, the process allows scrutiny.

In state-only forums, governments can present shutdowns as proportionate. They can frame connectivity tools as threats. They can invoke security narratives that go uncontested by those most affected and by the technical community.

And when the subject is satellite Internet, one of the few technologies capable of bypassing national shutdowns, the stakes are even higher. These are no longer abstract regulatory discussions. They are decisions that can determine whether people remain connected at all.

The Iranian government’s move to bring this issue before the ITU was not simply technical. It was strategic. If validated, even indirectly, it could set a precedent: that states can characterize emergency connectivity as a security threat and seek international backing to suppress it.

For people, this is not about regulatory procedure. It is about whether their last line to the world remains open.

When a technical governance body cannot hear from the very communities whose connectivity is at risk, and from the technical community on how shutdowns can never be proportionate, its decisions risk reinforcing the power of those who already control the switch.